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Abstract
In the current information-rich environment, it has become routine to broadcast 
and receive information via the media and most importantly the Internet. 
And with such flexibility in the distribution of information and its channels 
comes the huge risk of the information being compromised, tampered with, or 
corrupted.  Such intentional acts of compromising and corrupting information 
for a certain goal constitute what is known as Information Warfare. Because 
Information Warfare can be carried out on different forms of communication 
and channels in information flows, devising a model to simulate the attacks is 
vital to analyse and prevent information tampering. Many models have been 
proposed that use an array of underlying theories that range from schematic 
modelling, to information science and cognitive studies. However, the problem 
is that modelling the Information Warfare battle theatre using existing models 
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results in tabular and tree schemas that are populated by percentages and 
numbers, which reflect the information attack but in a difficult and non-
visualized manner. In this paper, attempts will be made to introduce a new 
modelling scheme to capture the elements of Information Warfare, including 
the participating parties, attacks, channels, and noise in the form of models that 
use information flow and visible entities. Because Information Warfare can 
have many forms, and can be made at several levels, several existing models 
lack some design elements that are critical in capturing the attacks. The model 
developed here will investigate, precisely, the information exchanged between 
the entities and their state. Information exchange can show where information 
is from and where it is destined to go, while, entity states provide what type of 
information is flowing. The methods of the modelling proposed in this paper 
incorporate several established modelling methods that include Information 
Flow Model and Game Theory, and forms of asynchronous communication. 
Keywords: asynchronous communication, flow model, game theory, 
information warfare
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1.0   Introduction
The telecommunication networks, satellite networks, the Internet, and 
the mass media all overlay our knowledge sphere, willingly or unwillingly, 
to the point where we can no longer determine the information we receive, 
its source, its authenticity, or its state, whether this information is quoted, 
original, or corrupted. And with the wealth of data spread around the Internet 
– one of the contemporary silos of our knowledge – it becomes even more 
difficult to differentiate data from information. Data are numbers, figures, and 
letters, while information is a collection of data where a conclusion or a fact 
can be extracted. Knowledge, however, is the state where information can be 
predicted, analysed, understood, and connected. Not being able to connect, 
understand, or authenticate the information source, validity, or completeness 
becomes a major threat in information systems, databases, and strategic and 
military situations.
Since information is all around us, and its channels are mostly open and 
unsecure, the quality of information we receive and its integrity should be 
questionable, at least if we are talking about vital and sensitive information, 
with which an enemy can gain an advantage from its misuse, information that 
can compromise individuals, and organizations. This type of information is 
the typical target for Information Warfare campaigns. Information Warfare 
(IW) can be defined as the usage of information to gain an advantage over an 
opponent. This can be achieved by tampering with the information, corrupting 
its data, reading its sensitive content, disabling it, or concatenating it with 
additional data. In light of this definition, we can consider IW no less important 
than any other type of warfare and, as in any warfare, strategy and modelling of 
the situations and attacks are keys to gaining advantages. As with any warfare 
campaigns, the attackers can initiate their attacks at different levels, with varied 
forms of attacks, and employ a wide range of tools and techniques.  
The primary use of IW is in the military battle theatre, but it is not to be 
confused with the more general term of Command and Control, as stated in 
[1], where IW is used as a tool. IW encompasses many elements including 
information exchange protocols, human communication theories, political 
correctness of practices, game theories, and the public domain range of 
information. IW plays a key role in the military field; its strategies and tools 
are studied as part of military disciplinary curriculum. 
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In this paper, attempts to make a new modelling scheme in order to capture 
IW battle theatre will use the Flow Model (FM), which was founded by [2], 
because it will help in formulating a model for an IW battle theatre by enabling 
more granular description of information flow, with its representation of states. 
FM models the state of information in one entity and the flow of information 
from state to state and from entity to entity, and a single entity can have several 
states, and several flows of information. Identifying the state of the information 
and its source and destination is integral in developing a strategy for IW, and FM 
provides the necessary tools. The FM provides a way to identify the roles of the 
communicating parties whether actively creating, transferring, and processing 
information, or passively, as in receiving and releasing information. Entities can 
be asymmetrical and have different states; flow of information can occur inside the 
states of the same entity or from one entity’s states to the states of other entities. 
The second of the tools that will be used is the use of Game Theory in 
developing strategies for IW tactics, as used in [3], and examples will be 
given to illustrate the situation. Game theory provides analytical tools and 
algorithms that when used by a computer can help in predicting the enemy’s 
next movement and suggest several possible courses of action that would 
follow the scenario at hand. Game theory also provides many forms that can 
be adapted to different situations (such as game type) and, with this flexibility, 
IW attacks can be modelled and solutions for them can be found or, at least, 
IW battle theatre situations can be modelled.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II related work in the field 
of information, IW, modelling, and FM modelling and game theory modelling 
will be discussed. In Section III, game theory is described, and how a game 
theoretic approach can yield grounds for modelling IW battle theatre attacks is 
explained. Section IV illustrates further examples and models of game theory 
using examples from IW, with asynchronous communication and hyper games. 
Both asynchronous communication and hyper games are realistic models of IW 
attacks. In Section V, the extended FM will be shown, in which FM is extended 
to include asynchronous communication, and is called FM Extended (FME). 
Section VI includes a case study in which the implementation of an example, 
its modelling, and the amalgam model (FM + FME + Game Model) will be 
used in a very well known puzzle game based on the absence of knowledge 
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(asynchronous communication). Section VII contains a discussion of the 
results of the models made in the figures and the case study example in Section 
VI, and assesses how the models have helped in viewing the solution for the 
example. Finally, section VIII contains concluding remarks.  
2.0  Related Works
The field of information warfare has attracted the attention of many 
researchers from the communication field, because IW is almost always 
defined in communication terms, as many researchers view it from this 
perspective. The United States Air Force (USAF) defines IW as ‘activities 
taken to manipulate or destroy an adversary’s information without visibly 
changing the physical entity within which it resides’ [4]. From the works of 
[5], we can define IW as ‘any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the 
enemy’s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those 
actions and exploiting our own military information functions’. These four 
main strategies have been the basis of IW studies by [6]. The first is to deny; 
it is the act of denying the receiver access to information at the source, which 
is also in [7]. The second strategy is to exploit; this is the act of knowing the 
information passed and utilizing it to one’s advantage. The third strategy is to 
corrupt; this is the act of changing or altering the information from the source, 
in order to use that to our advantage. The fourth and last strategy is to destroy; 
this is the act of overwhelming the information with enough noise such that 
it is useless at the receiver’s end, as if had been destroyed. IW can also be 
a tool to prevent military actions. While not a diplomatic action, engaging 
in careful IW can still prevent wars and make way for a non-aggressive, yet 
transgressive attitude that abhors military action, and clever IW can solve, or 
soften situations, as stated in [1] . Understanding IW also implies a knowledge 
of information theory, and human intelligence: how humans think and upon 
what bases they act. In [1], it is stated that forming a hierarchy is critical, such 
as in Decision Support Systems (DSS), and Management Information Systems 
MIS. The Command and Control (C2), and the Observe, Orient, Decide, and 
Act (OODA) paradigm are both paradigms used to analyse decision making 
activities and affecting factors in the decision making process. These form 
cognitive hierarchies.
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For the modelling of IW, the early works and one of the most fundamental 
is as in [8]. In his model Shannon defines IW as the capacity of the channel 
between a sender and receiver as C, where we have the bandwidth W, and 
signal vs. noise power P/N, given by this equation:
C = W Log 2 (1+ P/N)                                  (1)       from Shannon (1948) [8]
Shannon’s work, although it has been the basis of many works such 
as those of [5] and [9], lacks the state of the information when it is being 
transferred such as released, created or processed, which is noted by the [10]. 
As described in [2], where the foundation of the Flow Model is found, the 
FM model defines the five states of information (created, released, received, 
processed, and transferred); furthermore, it also defines the flow of information 
from one state to another, or from one entity to another. The FM is used to 
model Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers; it is also compared to 
Shannon’s communication model. In relation to things that flow, the (OSI) 
model makes it possible to have a more granular view of each layer in the OSI. 
Using the FM to model IW strategies should provide more information since 
previous work, such as Shannon, has ignored the information states. The idea 
of states in the FM is essential in its usage, since it gives greater elaboration 
to the modelled system.
In the works of [3] and [11], Game Theory is used as a tool to model IW 
strategies. A Game Model (GM) can model many real-life situations if we 
can identify the system we want to model as a game, where we have players, 
goals, and conditions. GM provides means to predict, or anticipate the attacker 
moves by using the correct algorithms for determining the Course of Action 
(COA), given a correct GM model that would model the exact IW theatre. In 
addition, GM provides the means to suggest better COAs to prevent attacks 
from the enemies by analysing the possible scenarios of the current situation. 
However, as pointed out by [3], using heuristic algorithms may either take 
time to processes, or may result in non-optimum solutions, and may hinder 
the potential of using game theoretic approaches to IW. Moreover, game 
theory itself is difficult to implement in the dynamic field of IW. The bases for 
modelling using GM are two elements which form the tactical engine; they are 
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the search technique, and the evaluation function. The first determines what is 
the most advantageous move to take, while the second element evaluates the 
players’ positions and how vulnerable each one is, and what the advantages 
are for each player’s position. Therefore, initiating the search technique (which 
is mostly a heuristic algorithm) will produce several actions by the players, 
and their consequences, and so form a tree. After that, the evaluation function 
will gather the weights of value on each level of the tree, and produce the best 
COA for the player.  
[12] explains just how important IW is, and how much economic impact 
it has. Burke also shows how IW is still not well understood, despite its 
importance, by some governments and institutions because of its complexity 
and interoperability with other disciplines. IW is complex because of its varied 
elements and conditions; for example, the attackers can have many different 
goals and objectives; the attackers also have many subtle and unorthodox 
ways of approaching their targets. He suggests the use of the Game Theory 
approach to help formulate and model the IW battle theatre. Burke suggests 
the use of the Game Theory approach to help formulate and model the IW 
battle theatre. The reason behind this is that game theory has proved itself 
in the diplomatic and military fields. However, game theory application and 
modelling is challenging by itself. Incorporating game theory elements (which 
include: players, goals, strategies, equilibrium, and repeated games - with 
absence of knowledge), Burke modelled an IW situation as a repeated game 
(with absence of knowledge and predicting strategies). Problems arose from 
the fact that game and IW principles collided, and it was difficult to find a 
middle ground. For example, in the experiment the players were randomly 
chosen types, and it was assumed that different types did not affect the overall 
equilibrium calculations. This, however, is a compromise made for the sake 
of illustrating the concept. In the end, the findings in [12] showed how critical 
it is to model IW, and how appropriate Game Theory is to model IW.  In 
his work, Burke described the IW Game theoretic model as basic elements 
which are: the players, payoff, information, and moves. The second level 
is the game representation model, whether normal form or extensive form; 
and the third level is the equilibrium, whether Nash Equilibrium or Bayesian 
Equilibrium. The final level is the repeated games that incorporate absence 
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of knowledge. Developing these levels, from one to four, the modeller must 
improve in building this model to ensure a detailed and well-planned model 
that has the potential to be used in real-life military situations, which need 
formal modelling schemas that are reliable and trustworthy. Software can also 
be used after careful modelling of the IW battle theatre. 
IW has seen many adaptations, most prominently using Game Theory. The 
only drawbacks that have been seen are the difficulties in implementation and 
the complexity of GM algorithms themselves. The modelling used range from 
simple tree structure to simple UML like charts. These modelling schemas 
lack high level details, and information state and information flow as well. 
Developing a modelling schema to model GM and IW attacks is critical in 
solving this problem.
FM has been introduced in Sabah [2] and it has been used in many fields 
that include, but are not exclusive to, its proposed application in database 
access control [13] and in information security [14]. FM is based on two 
main ideas: flow-things, and information states. The first is the idea that 
information (or any signal, wave, or any communication channel) can travel 
from one entity to another. The second is that entities can have many states 
and information travels from state to state; information can travel from states 
of the same entity or to a different entity’s states. There are six basic states 
which are: released, transfer, processed, created, arrived, and accepted. The 
first is when the flow-thing is released from one state to another; ‘transfer’ is 
when a flow-thing is being transferred from one state to another; ‘processed’ 
is when a flow-thing is being updated or modified; ‘created’ is when a flow-
thing is being originally created at the entity; ‘arrived’ is when a flow-thing is 
being received from another state or another entity’s state; and ‘accepted’ is 
when an entity has accepted the flow-things. There is a seventh state, which 
is ‘storage’, but this is not standard to FM, and it is only used when needed; 
it indicates when an entity stores flow-things, leaving FM with its default five 
states and the standard flow between them, as shown in Fig. 1. It is worth 
noting that FM is very flexible; any modeller can use any number of states to 
model the entity and even the default information flow can be changed as well 
to accurately model the entity [15] . FM will provide a visual representation 
to IW when used to model IW battle theatre. This will be used in this paper 
in addition to GM, and with a modification to FM that is novel to this paper.
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Figure 1: The FM model
Most modelling methods used to model IW consider synchrony in 
communication or disregard the element of time in communication through 
negligence of its effect; however, this leads to gaps in these models, such as 
the normal and extensive game models. Asynchronous communication can 
provide absence of knowledge, which of itself is a vital key element in IW. 
By introducing the time axis to the communication model we can have time 
stamped messaging between the entities; the use of logical clocks, in which 
each entity keeps track of its own time can also be used [16], but this will not 
be considered. In [17], asynchrony is modelled using vector clocks; again, 
they will not be considered. Adding time to the FM model will yield the FM 
extended (FME) model. FME will be explained thoroughly in Section V, and 
it is novel to this paper.  
This paper shall demonstrate the modelling of an IW battle theatre in 
four different contexts: in the modelling FM, the extended FM (FM with 
asynchronous communication), GM, and a combination model (amalgam 
model) of all techniques (FM, FME, and GM). The asynchronous systems 
are introduced in order to develop more realistic situations, and to develop 
complex examples, extending the works of [3] and [12].
3.0  A Game Theory Approach
Game Theory provides not only models but also a strategic point of view 
with possible scenarios involving what each player would do to succeed. When 
modelling the IW battle theatre as a game, it is possible to model the attacks 
as games (e.g.: zero sums, constant sum, or non zero sum), in which we have 
players, goals, actions, and conditions. The COA can be predicted, depending 
Created
Processed
Released
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Transferred
Arrived
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on the game, attacks, as well as the motivation and alternative actions [3]. 
Game Theory has been used to model several concepts as games in many fields, 
including economics, biology, politics, and even philosophy. So Game Theory 
provides rich sets of mathematical tools that can be harnessed to model IW. An 
important and elemental principle in Game Theory is the Nash Equilibrium, 
which is the configuration for the existence of a win-win strategy in a game 
given the scenario and environment. This is a critical tool of analysis as its 
existence can change the inputs and output of the warfare, stemming from the 
strategy that provides the Nash equilibrium [12]. An example will be given in 
the following paragraphs to illustrate the models, and FM will also be used. 
The example will show the contrast in modelling IW in contrast to Shannon’s 
model as set out in [8].
As an example, the example provided in [3], which is an excellent example 
of a Game Theory approach toward IW, will be studied in this section, and 
FM will be added to it. Figure 2 shows the example model. A brief summary 
of the example is: a Centralized Defence Controller (CDC) which defends the 
database A,B,C and D. The Internet, which is where the enemies reside, will 
probably launch an attack on CDC’s database. CDC predicts that the attacks 
will come from the firewall’s weakest link, and then tries to fishbowl the
Figure 2: FM Information Warfare Theatre
CDC
Networks A, B, C and D
Firewall
Feedback
Gather
Pass
The Internet
Attacker
Create
Release Transfer
Process
Receive
CDC - Implement Strategy
to protect the Network
Attacker - Implement Strategy
to Attack the Network
Create
Release Transfer
Process
Receive
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attacker and gives it false data to try to understand the attacker’s intentions. In 
addition, CDC will try to replicate the database to increase availability in the 
case of a denial of service attack. After this we can see that CDC can predict 
the attackers’ next move or at least take precautionary actions.
In Figure 2, the additions are the introduction of FM into the model. 
CDC flows of actions are modelled precisely because of information 
flow from external actions (from both the environment and the attackers). 
Understanding the triggers that cause such reactions from both the attacker 
and defender can make developing a protective strategy by the defender 
easier. Furthermore, the model now gives more insight to all entities. Using 
FM terminology of information exchange, we can see how the flow changes 
actions. While Shannon’s Model lacks a state for information and focuses on 
the channels’ capacity and clarity (Noise), by introducing FM we can capture 
the information’s state, its influence and the subsequent actions that follow. The 
model also shows that the firewall can also be split into two flow models: one 
for the passing of users, while the other represents the information gathering 
mechanism, the information from which is later analysed by the CDC. The 
Internet has the expected “Enemy Attacker”, which is also represented by a 
flow model. Finally the networks A, B, C, and D are also flow models along 
with the CDC itself. When a suspicious activity is found at the firewalls this 
triggers an action of information being made at the CDC. Now CDC sends 
the made information to the network to suspect suspicious activity. Using 
this simple triggering mechanism the modeller can have a system that can 
anticipate attacks and can be used for analysis and scrutiny.
4.0   Hyper Games and FM
In the environment a flow of information may not always be visible to any 
party; in this case we have what is known as the absence of knowledge. [18] 
introduced the situation where information is not available, and we have to model 
the system as a hyper game. In a hyper game the participating players may: 
Not know the number of players• 
Not know the choices available• 
Not know the goal of the game• 
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Figure 3: Hyper Games with FM notation
This is quite true in real life situations of IW, where deception, espionage, 
and undercover operations take place. So each player now has a perceived 
knowledge of the other players’ strategies and moves, and based on that the 
player takes action. FM is introduced into the system in Figure 3. Figure 3 
shows the introduction of FM elements into the model. As a complementary 
element, FM illustrates how and where information flows. For example, the 
player perceives information from the released or transferred information 
flowing from the other players and from their actions. Knowing the state of 
the information might give us a value of its authenticity and purpose, and 
allow the users to analyse the information more carefully [2]. 
An example is when the enemy – a competing player – tries to send 
deceptive information to lure the victim into performing certain actions; this 
can be prevented if the victim knew that the information was created by rather 
than released from the enemy. In light of this, the victim can develop strategies 
to prevent the four canonical attack strategies. As a last note, it can be seen 
that the models that have been introduced so far lack messages (information 
flow synchrony), the models do not show time flow and so the model viewer 
cannot know if the actions are casual, concurrent or sequential.
5.0   The Extended FM
So far the models that have been discussed did not deal with synchrony and 
assumed that the channels propagated the information synchronously. In the 
real world, information propagation is asynchronous between the parties, 
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Figure 4: Time Variance
and to model this more accurately in the FM [15], extra elements need to 
be added. The dimension of time will be used to implement asynchrony, as 
in Figure 4.  This is called the FM Extended (FME) and it is the proposed 
addition to the FM modelling schema, and is novel to the present work. FME 
captures information systems more realistically, as asynchronous systems are 
the prevailing types of systems, especially in communication. In a synchronous 
system the information flows from source to destination at the same time, while 
in an asynchronous system information arrives at the destination at a different 
time from when it was sent, and it can be delayed, lost, or out of order.
Using this notation, the model can show the viewer how fresh the 
information is (freshness means how much time has passed since this 
information was broadcast); since out of date information is either useless, or 
it may be delayed, this can reflect possible enemy intrusion. The FME extends 
the FM by introducing time, but synchrony is still difficult to model with one 
time axis. The model can also use logical clock [16], in which each entity keeps 
track of its own logical clock, while receiving the logical clock of the others 
when receiving information from them. A logical clock is a clock maintained 
by an entity to keep track of its own events. The need for logical clocks stems 
from the concurrency in the system and asynchrony; for example, maintaining 
physical clock synchronisation is impossible since actual physical clocks are 
never synchronous. Thus the use of logical clocks helps in synchrony, but a 
more robust approach would be to add Vector Clocks VC [17].  However, for 
simplicity VC will not be considered in the present case. 
TIME 
Entity A Entity B 
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Figure 5: Concurrency (Source: Gosh, 2006)
In Figure 5, viewers can tell that (a) happened before (b), but cannot say 
anything about (g) and (f). In the case of (a) and (b), the viewer can have a 
partial order and so a form of causality, for (g) and (f) it can be said that they 
are concurrent, meaning there is no synchrony between them [17].
6.0 Case Study
In this section, an amalgam of Game Theory, FM, and the FME will be 
employed to model an example of an IW theatre. The model will include the 
information environment and its outcome on the players, environment, and 
the overall result of the system. The example that will be used is a classic 
example on IW, and the effect of knowledge in a system; it is also an example 
of how much absence of knowledge is as vital as its presence.
In the work of [19], the Cheating Husbands Dilemma (CHD) is presented. 
The paper presents the problem and gives variations for it. CHD shows how 
critical the flow of information is, whether direct or indirect, in an environment 
where one participant’s movement can cause the participants to take actions 
based on that movement. In addition, the relation between information, 
actions and decisions is shown to be highly correlated. In relation to IW, the 
CHD dilemma can be considered as an example of an information attack. It 
also shows how absence of knowledge that is caused due to asynchronous 
communication can give rise to new actions in the entities’ life time during 
the attack. FM will introduce flow of knowledge, GM will add the players 
and conditions for winning, while FME will introduce the time axis in terms 
of days and nights.
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The Cheating Husbands Dilemma states: 
“In a faraway land, the Queen has declared the following:
‘There is at least one or more unfaithful husband in our land
Every wife who knows that her husband is unfaithful shall shoot him the night she 
discovers it
No wife knows anything about her husband, only the other husbands. 
And a wife shall not exchange her information with other wives.’
Thus declares the queen.”
In Figure 6, the FME flow model is used for the problem, which is an 
IW situation. The model captures each wife’s information flow, and how a 
wife is influenced by the others’ movements and actions. For simplicity, the 
problem will be solved under the assumption of one unfaithful husband. The 
new model which has been proposed shall provide helpful annotations that 
help in capturing the problem. FME highlights the time axis introduced, which 
is the day and night cycle. FM highlights the information flow, while GM 
gives the players and conditions. The model in Fig. 6 explains the problem 
thoroughly.  
Figure 6: CHD modelled as a FME
Wife
KILLS
Husband C Faithful
Wife A
Husband A Unfaithful
Wife B
Husband B Faithful
DAY 0
Wife
Husband C Faithful
Wife A
Husband A Unfaithful
Wife B
Husband B Faithful
DAY 1
Wife C
Husband C Faithful
Wife A
Husband A Unfaithful
Wife B
Husband B Faithful
NIGHT 0
KNOWS
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Figure 7: CHD modelled as a normal from game
Solution for One Unfaithful Husband: Let us assume that wife A’s husband 
is unfaithful. Then all the other wives will know that since A’s husband is 
unfaithful, the condition of “at least one unfaithful husband” is met, and they 
will not kill theirs. For wife A, since she hears no gun fire the first night, she 
knows that every husband besides hers is faithful. Again based on the first 
term of the Queen’s declaration, wife A will deduce that her husband must be 
the unfaithful one to fulfil the term 1. So she will shoot him on the first night. 
The general solution is that if we had N unfaithful husbands, the wives will 
wait for N nights, and on the last night shoot their husbands. 
Now in Figure 6 we can see that FME with GM portrays the solution. The 
Game Theory model alone, which can model the system using the normal form, 
might not show the flow of information nor the asynchrony involved which is 
shown in Figure 7, as in [17], in the case of a CHD with a population of two. 
We can embed each wife model in FME with the normal form as a base for 
the strategy of decision making. Indirect information flow is also shown as 
dotted lines, but nonetheless affects the participant players. We assume only 
three houses in the land, with families A, B and C. In DAY 0, it is the first day 
after the declaration, it can be seen that each wife is gathering information 
about the other wives’ husbands. In NIGHT 0, in the night of the same day, 
each wife – without exchanging information - deduces facts from her gathered 
information. Wife A shoots her husband based on the information she got from 
her environment. The other wives hear gunshots and deduce that wife A has 
 
Wife A Shoots Wife A Does Not 
Shoot 
Wife B Shoots 
Wife B Does Not 
Shoot 
0/0 
Impossible 
1/1 
Impossible 
1/0 
Husband B IS 
Unfaithful 
0/1 
Husband A IS 
Unfaithful 
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actually killed her husband. In DAY 1, each of wives B and C know for sure 
that the husband of Wife A is dead. 
The CHD can be implemented in an information critical situation such 
as IW during combat, espionage, and/or conflict. The problem also introduces 
the idea of information deduction in case of the absence of knowledge (e.g. a 
wife cannot know about her husband’s fidelity), and how critical the amount 
of information a player has, because too much information can also be harmful 
(e.g.  if a wife did not know about all the other husbands, she will not shoot hers) 
[3, 12]. FME, FM, and GM in the amalgam model of Figure 6 have showed 
greater explanation for the problem solution.
7.0 Discussion
From the models introduced in Figure 3 and Figure 6, it can be seen that 
the model promulgated above has more clarity, which benefits its usage in IW. 
Because the main problems seen in existing IW models are that the models 
are rather difficult to understand, they come in tabular forms (as in Normal 
games), or as scenarios (as in Extended games). However, these often lead to 
numbers and figures scattered with no information flow or representations of 
entities, which is why FM and FME were added to GM and used together. 
In Figure 2, using the FM, with GM, the IW situation can be seen. FM 
has modelled - each entity as a flow system, with flow-things moving states; 
the entities are the CDC, Firewall, and the Internet (where the attacker is). 
Flow of information from one entity to another can be seen, and from a certain 
state to a certain state. GM has introduced the players, which are the entities. 
It can be illustrated as a normal game using a tabular form. The granular view 
in Figure 2 shows CDC and the Internet, which is the attacker. Both have 
symmetrical schema, which shows that created information goes out directly, 
thereby representing new information, while received information can be 
processed and transferred, and this may indicate corrupt data. Received data, 
processed and released can also show data that has been tampered with. Since 
FM introduces information flow in the model, the designer has more capacity 
to convey more information. For example, if we had a larger environment with 
multiple attackers attacking at different layers and targeting different targets, 
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the model would show its real capacity for capturing real life IW attacks. Also 
each entity can be modelled as an FM as well. Of course, this would increase 
the complexity of the model, but it would provide a finer and more granular 
view of the IW attack theatre. 
From Figure 3, we see a Game Theory model of an IW battle theatre. FM 
elements were introduced into the model as well. The GM shows a Degradation 
Strategy in which outcome models affect the perceived opponent model. The 
perceived models have a state of Create, while the entity attack model has the 
Processed state. This is used because the entity attack model is used at every 
stage, and so it is processed, and might carry over from previous stages. On 
the other hand, the perceived opponent model creates information, because it 
is new or almost new at every stage, and so it is updated at every step. Both 
outcomes, processed and created, pour into the Decision Function, which 
can be a heuristic algorithm that is used as the search function from a game 
theoretic algorithm. Finally, the Decision Function will produce Actions that 
will go directly to the opponent. Figure 5 illustrated a hyper game in which 
each participating party has no knowledge of what the other players’ goals 
are, the choices available, and/or the number of participating players in the 
game. FM and GM have helped explain the hyper game more clearly; if only 
words were used, and a more complex example was used, the explanation 
would not suffice. GM shows how each party flows from inception to decision 
of actions, while FM shows how each party’s action affects the others, and 
how the internal information flow is in an entity. Indirect information flow 
is dotted, and it stems from the perceived model of attack from both sides. 
Viewers of the model can also notice that the created, processed, and released 
FM annotation shows the information and its state. This can help in analysing 
the data flow, its source and its credibility from both sides. For example, if the 
victim is receiving a piece of information that is created at the attacker, this 
should be handled with vigilance, as it is probably harmful in some form.
In Figure 4 and Figure 5 more elaborations are introduced to the models. 
The first shows information flow over the flow of time, since time was not 
considered earlier. This form of FM is called the proposed FME. FME can 
help in modelling asynchronous information flow. The latter figure, Figure 
5, is the general form of a concurrent system, with several entities having 
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asynchronous communication with one another (from [17]). Entities from a 
through are concurrent and are communicating; with the flow of time, it is 
critical to have a linear order for this communication in order to model the 
exact form of information flow. The simple UML, like the flow diagram in 
Figure 5, shows exactly at each point in time when and from whom each 
message is sent and received. Introducing such an element into a model for IW 
would be essential. In this paper, GM and FM have been used, and in Figure 6, 
FM, FME and GM are used together in order to incorporate all elements and 
properties that would capture a more detailed and complicated understanding 
of an IW battle theatre. 
Moving on to Figure 6, where we have the CHD illustrated in FME and 
GM modelling schemas, we can see the whole CHD as a diagram or a flow 
chart. Because the example used a simple population of 3 entities (house A 
with Wife A, Husband A, house B, with Wife B, Husband B, and house C, with 
Wife C, and Husband C), it was easy to determine the data flow. However, 
this simplicity is adopted for time and space constraints, because a bigger 
population would at least double the size of this already large diagram. Yet 
again, using a more realistic number for the problem (e.g. more than 40), and 
modelling the problem using the FME and GM modelling proposed in this 
work, would prove very useful, and interesting in illustrating the solution, 
especially since its solution uses mathematics, but needs illustration to make 
it clear for scholars and readers. For example, with that number of population, 
trying to prove the general solution would be easier. The general solution, 
which states that if we had N husbands, the wives would take N nights to kill 
their own husband, from [19], will be modelled using the proposed model. 
Going back to Figure 6, we can see that we have the course of one day (DAY 
0, NIGHT 0) and a half (DAY 1), and that is by following the logic of the 
puzzle. On DAY 0, we see that there is information flow as arrows show that, 
from FME, while GM provides that each house is an entity with two players, 
a husband and wife. Since the puzzle states that each wife knows about the 
fidelity and infidelity of each other wife’s husband, but not that of her own 
husband, there is no information flow between a wife and her own husband. 
Moving on to NIGHT 0, since this example is also a hyper game, where there 
is an absence of knowledge, which is a critical and a real life aspect of most 
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IW battle theatre attacks, the players (active players, who are the wives) will 
act upon decided actions based on the absence of knowledge. Each wife would 
listen for a gun to fire, but since Wife B and Wife C already know that there 
is at least one cheating husband and it is husband A, they would not suspect 
their own husbands, even though they have no knowledge of his infidelities. 
Only one, who is Wife A, has the knowledge that both other husbands are 
faithful, so according to the rules of the puzzle that state there is at least one 
or more, she acts based on the absence of knowledge that hers is the one, and 
kills him; meanwhile, the other wives hear the gun fire. Again FME allowed 
the action KILL to flow from wife A to her husband, and again if we had a 
bigger population (simulated using software) the model would truly be useful. 
Finally, arriving at DAY 1, we have husband A dead, and the other wives would 
soon learn that, and the puzzle is complete. Wife A would also check on all 
surrounding spouses, but because the example used one cheating husband, the 
state of the system reaches equilibrium and its stays that way. The modelling 
could have used the GM in extensive form, which would lead to a tree, but 
again, since the actions of the puzzle follow one path (from root and down a 
single branch), its use was unnecessary. Fig. 6 showed FME in action, and it 
is simple to follow.   
Finally in Fig. 7, the GM model for the CHD problem is shown. It is 
modelled as a normal game. All possible outcomes are mapped, but it lacks 
the landscape and granular view of FME. Since the puzzle has one solution, all 
other solutions are impossible except that wife A Shoots and wife B Does Not 
Shoot. Again GM hides many details and only shows the outcome. Its shows 
the players and conditions, but there are no representations of the information 
flow that took place in the problem. Furthermore, if the number of couples 
was greater than 40, the tabular form would be unreasonably large, and how 
information flow happened would be lost, with only the results shown.
  
8.0  Concluding Remarks
Information technology has made information ubiquitous, on more than 
any level we could have ever imagined in modern times, from radio, TV, media, 
Internet, and even in the palms of our own hands, with smart devices. It is 
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almost impossible to ignore the flow of information, not just from trustworthy 
sources (e.g. books, official documents), but from almost any type of source 
(e.g. individuals, paid organizations, enemies who want an advantage, stalkers, 
or even a propaganda campaign from an organization or company). This 
relentless flow impacts all our information and knowledge spheres, and affects 
all levels of our interactions, and manipulates all fields of information, from 
news to databases (political and governmental issues aside). With that boon 
(or curse), information fidelity, integrity, and authenticity (especially in 
cases of sensitive information, information that can compromise individuals 
and nations as well), have become things of suspicion, because information 
channels are vulnerable and wide. Targeting information has become a feat of 
which many professionals and organizations are capable.  If an enemy wanted 
to launch an attack using information (Information Warfare), then the enemy 
would go to lengths to make it as subtle as possible. To counter this requires 
a good modelling schema to model IW, and one which has the capacity to 
capture information flow. 
A good basis for an IW model is a robust model to represent the information 
and the environment and, importantly, communication channels, information 
flow, and information states. Although several models to model the IW Theatre 
have been proposed, the majority ignore information states, and information 
flow. These modelling schemas give either tables or a collection of numbers 
to represent the IW, such as GM modelling or behavioural logs and statistics 
that indicate suspicious activities. This gap was the incentive for the present 
research; that is, to find alternatives to model IW, using FM, FM and GM, 
and a proposed FME.
In this paper, FM, GM, and and the proposed FME, as well as an amalgam 
model (which encompasses all three FM, FME, and GM) that incorporates 
the information states from FM, GM models and scenarios, have been used. 
The first introduces states and flow to the information representation elements 
and provides flow as to where the information is generated and where it will 
go, and the states of the information, whether original, created, or tampered 
with, processed, or in transition, released, or transferred. The second, which is 
Game Theory modelling, provides a tool to analyse the IW as a game model 
and then formulates strategies based on that abstraction and on well known 
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algorithms, using a normal game model. The third and final addition, which 
is FME, is an extension to the FM that provides out-of-order communication, 
since FM assumes that all participants and users are in phase. This gives 
more realism to the modelling schema, and so enables modelling of a more 
complex and realistic problem, that is in need of illustration for proof and 
study purposes. 
The amalgam model (of Figure 6)  included GM, FM, and and the novel 
FME notations, where GM set the players, conditions, and enemy entities, 
FM introduced information flow, and entity and information states, and FME 
introduced the time and asynchronous communications. The model included 
players (wives and husbands), conditions (cheating husbands), information 
flow (knows, kills), and time and asynchronous communication (day 0, night 
0, and asynchronous communication in information flow). The amalgam 
model still needs more thorough studies of its properties as well as a more 
rigid formulation connecting its main components (FM, GM, and FME) in 
one solid definition. These areas are subjects of further study. For example, 
the bonds between the separate models are still not very concrete, and the way 
the different elements of the different models interact still needs a more formal 
definitive way of application. Adding time to all the FM entities (which may 
or may not have all FM states), has been introduced by FME, but still needs 
more usage. In addition, using more game models to formulate the diagram 
(such as normal form, and extensive form), different Game Theory algorithms 
that predict enemy movements, can also be incorporated into an FME model, 
because we can model these elements using the time frames. Incorporating 
more modelling schemes into FME may also give it wider use. The amalgam 
model reached in this paper can also be adapted to model areas in information 
other than IW battle theatre. All these are areas for future study.
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